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I present evidence that increases in net imports of pollution-intensive goods are too small to explain
more than about half of the pollution reductions from the changing mix of goods produced in the United
States. Together, these two findings demonstrate that shifting polluting industries overseas has played
at most a minor role in the cleanup of U.S. manufacturing.
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Technology, International Trade, and Pollution from U.S. Manufacturing  
Introduction 
Total pollution emitted by U.S. manufacturers has declined over the past 30 years, 
by amounts ranging from 30 percent for nitrogen oxides (NOx) to 66 percent for sulfur 
dioxide (SO2). At the same time, the real value of manufacturing output has increased by 
more than 70 percent. This cleanup can be divided into two components: (1) advances in 
production or abatement processes ("technology"), and (2) changes in the composition of 
goods manufactured in the United States. The change in industry composition can further 
be divided into (a) decreases in pollution-intensive goods consumed, and (b) increases in 
pollution-intensive goods imported ("international trade"). How much of the overall 
pollution reduction stems from technology, and how much from international trade?  
In Part 1 of this analysis, I show that technology accounts for well over half of the 
overall reductions in pollution from manufacturing. In Part 2, I show that increases in net 
imports of polluting goods can account for – at most – half of the pollution reductions 
resulting from the changing composition of U.S. manufacturing (which is itself a small 
part of the total per Part 1). Together, these two results demonstrate that shifting polluting 
industries overseas has played at most a minor role in the overall cleanup of the U.S. 
manufacturing sector.  
Allocating credit for the cleanup of manufacturing among these trends in 
technology and international trade is important for several reasons. Most U.S. 
environmental regulations have been designed explicitly to alter the technology of 
production, not the mix of goods produced or consumed. This paper asks whether U.S. 
manufacturing pollution has declined as a consequence of following the stated intent of 
the laws (changing technology) or as a consequence of avoiding those laws by producing 
overseas (international trade). More importantly, if the regulations have simply changed 
what gets manufactured domestically and have increased imports of polluting products 
from developing countries, the improvements experienced by the United States would not 
be replicable indefinitely on a global scale, because the poorest countries will never have 
even poorer countries from which to import their polluting products. However, if the 
cleanup has been the result of technology, that may well be replicable indefinitely, and 
may even be replicable more easily if there are economies of scale or learning-by-doing 
in abating pollution.    
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To be clear, manufacturing is not the only source of pollution in the United States. 
It accounts for less than 25 percent of the most common air pollutants (U.S. EPA 2000). 
Nevertheless, manufacturing does account for a large share of the rhetoric in the debate 
about the economic consequences of environmental regulations, the changes over time in 
the structure of the U.S. economy, and the effect of international trade on U.S. production 
workers and other countries' environments. Other major polluting sectors, such as electric 
utilities and transportation, are not subject to concerns about pollution havens or 
industrial flight, which is why I focus on manufacturing here.  
 In Part 1, I use data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
determine how much of the cleanup of U.S. manufacturing comes from changes in 
technology versus changes in the mix of industries. Because the EPA data report 
emissions back to 1970 for only four common air pollutants, this first part focuses on air 
pollution. I show that for the typical air pollutant, the cleanup from technology is at least 
as large as the cleanup from compositional change, and for some it is more than two 
times as large. The pace of that technological progress, however, has been slowing over 
time. Even though this type of decomposition analysis has deep roots in economics, 
going back at least to Leontief (1970), to my knowledge this is the first paper to divide 
pollution changes into its components in this way, or to demonstrate the technological 
slowdown.1  
In Part 2, I address whether the decline in U.S. pollution that results from 
increased imports is sufficiently large to explain the decline in pollution arising from the 
change in the composition of U.S. industries. Because this part does not require emissions 
data back to the 1970s, I expand the analysis to include 9 different air, water, and toxic 
pollutants. The basic approach was outlined by Koo (1974) and implemented in part by 
Khan (2003), Cole (2004), Ederington et al. (2004), and Gamper-Rabindran (2006). All 
this previous research finds that increases in imports of polluting goods cannot explain 
                                                 
1 See Ang (1999), Rose (1999) and Metcalf (2007) for decomposition analyses of energy use and pollution. 
Most such analyses fall into one of two categories: (1) index decomposition analysis (IDA), which uses 
industry-level data; and (2) structural decomposition analysis (SDA), which combines industry-level data 
with input-output tables. In this paper, I use elements from both approaches, relying on IDA for Part 1, 
where input-output tables are unnecessary, and then adding the input-output tables in Part 2 to study 
changes caused by imports, but without allowing the input-output requirements coefficients to change 
annually. See also Pasurka (2003) for an update and an application using two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes and SO2 pollution.    
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the composition shift of U.S. manufacturing toward cleaner goods. By ignoring the 
pollution caused by production of the intermediate inputs to imports, however, these 
papers all understate the degree to which those imports have displaced pollution in the 
United States.  
To account for intermediate inputs to imports, in Part 2 I use EPA data along with 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) input-output tables to construct total emissions 
intensities for each U.S. manufacturing industry in 1997, including the pollution caused 
by each industry's intermediate inputs. I show that even after accounting for intermediate 
inputs, the composition of imports to the United States has shifted towards cleaner goods, 
and that increases in international trade can account for at most only half of the pollution 
reductions from the changing composition of U.S. manufacturing. Foreign pollution 
havens have had a relatively small role in the composition shift of U.S. manufacturing 
away from polluting goods, and that composition shift in turn has had a small role in the 
overall cleanup of U.S. manufacturing. Technology has played by far the most important 
role in cleaning up U.S. manufacturing pollution. 
Part 1: Technology – An Indirect Assessment of the Technique Effect 
Between 1972 and 2002, total air pollution from U.S. manufacturing declined by 
approximately 60 percent. In this part of the paper, I show that changing production 
techniques account for the largest share of this cleanup, but that this share has been 
declining over time. 
Scale, Composition, and Technique in Theory 
Environmental economists now have a convention for thinking about changes in 
total pollution as coming from three sources: the overall size of the economy ("scale"), 
the mix of sectors comprising the economy ("composition"), and the technologies 
employed in production and abatement ("technique").2 Mathematically, the total amount 
of pollution from manufacturing, (P), can be written as the sum of pollution from each of 
its component industries, (pi). This in turn can be written as the total value shipped from 
manufacturing, (V), multiplied by the sum of each industry's share of total output, (θi = 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Grossman and Krueger (1993) or Copeland and Taylor (2005).    
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vi/V), times an emissions coefficient that reflects the amount of pollution per dollar of 
value shipped in that industry, (zi = pi/vi). 
 
  ii i i i
ii i
Ppv z V z θ == = ∑ ∑∑  (1) 
Or, in vector notation 
  PV ′ = θ z  (2) 
where P is a scalar representing the total pollution from manufacturing, and θ and z are 
n×1 vectors containing the market shares of each of the n industries and their pollution 
intensities, respectively. Totally differentiating equation (2) yields3 
 
  dP dV V d V d ′ ′′ = ++ θ zz θθ z (3) 
The first term in equation (3) is the scale effect, which explains what happens to 
total pollution as the overall size of the manufacturing sector increases, holding the 
composition of industries and their pollution intensities fixed. The second term is the 
composition effect, which accounts for the changing mix of industries, holding their scale 
and pollution intensities constant. And the third term is the technique effect, which 
captures changes in pollution intensities, holding the scale and composition of 
manufacturing fixed.4 
 Data on total pollution, (P), are taken from the National Emissions Inventory 
(NEI). The NEI is the U.S. EPA's clearinghouse for the wide variety of pollution data 
compiled by states and industries. It includes point, mobile, and area sources of pollution, 
including individual facility-level data for large point sources. The NEI reports emissions 
of four common air pollutants (known as "criteria" pollutants) back to 1970: SO2, NOx, 
carbon monoxide (CO), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs; a precursor to ozone, or 
                                                 
3 Equation (3) assumes no interaaction terms – that changing the scale of manufacturing does not affect the 
pollution intensities for example.  Or, equivalently, we can think of equation (3) as assuming that all of 
those interaction terms are combined into what I am calling technology, the third term which will just be a 
remainder after accounting for the first and second terms. 
4 Note that this technique effect could result from movement along a production possibility frontier (using a 
different mix of inputs within known production technologies), or a shift outward in a production 
possibility frontier (inventing new technologies).   See Fare et al. (1989 and 2001).    
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"smog").  To be consistent with the international trade data used in Part 2 below, I limit 
the analysis here to the period from 1972 to 2001. 
Unfortunately, the NEI does not simply report the amount emitted by 
manufacturing alone. Instead, its emissions data are organized by "activity" (such as fuel 
combustion and transportation, among others). Table 1 describes the 14 categories of 
activities in the NEI. Those marked with an asterisk in the table are included here as an 
approximation of manufacturing emissions. 
For data on total manufacturing output and the output of each industry (V and vi), 
I use the manufacturing productivity database (NBER-CES; Bartelsman and Gray 1996). 
These are derived from the Annual Survey of Manufactures conducted by the U.S. 
Census Bureau. 
Data on pollution intensities, (z), are the final element. For these, I rely on the 
U.S. EPA's Trade and Environmental Assessment Model (TEAM), which has as its core 
a list of emissions intensities by six-digit North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) codes. These data were assembled by the U.S. EPA and Abt Associates (2004) 
to assess the environmental effect of economic changes, such as those that might arise 
from international trade agreements. TEAM uses the raw inputs to the 1997 NEI, first 
matching emissions to individual facilities and then aggregating across the six-digit 
NAICS codes to which those facilities belong. TEAM can be used to generate emissions 
factors (environmental consequences per dollar of output) for 1,099 six-digit NAICS 
industry codes, and for more than 1,000 different environmental outcomes, including air 
pollutants, individual toxic chemicals, hazardous waste, and land use.5 Here I focus on 
the 473 six-digit NAICS codes that comprise the manufacturing sector and on the four 
criteria air pollutants reported by the NEI consistently since 1970.  
Estimating how much of the pollution reduction over the past 30 years can be 
attributed to each of the three effects in equation (3) requires annual data on total 
pollution, (P), total output, (V), and each industry's contribution to output, (θi). The one 
element of equation (3) that is not available by year is z, each industry's emissions 
                                                 
5 TEAM also disaggregates these emissions factors geographically (by U.S. county), although I am relying 
on national averages for this study.    
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intensity. I have data on z for only one year, 1997, and so I calculate the first and second 
terms in equation (3) and calculate the third term as the remainder. 
At this point, it is worth raising a few conceptual data issues – the NEI 
approximation of manufacturing pollution, outsourcing electricity generation, changing 
industry definitions, and changing relative product prices. 
The NEI Manufacturing Approximation 
The NEI categorizes pollution by "activity code", as listed in Table 1, and no 
combination of those codes exactly matches the manufacturing sector. The best I can do 
is to approximate total manufacturing pollution using the five activity codes marked with 
asterisks in Table 1. This means that the definition of "manufacturing" in the TEAM data 
(used to construct z) will differ from the definition in the NEI data (used to construct P). 
Fortunately, all I am really concerned about is explaining pollution changes in percentage 
terms (with units being irrelevant to the decomposition). For this reason, any mismatch 
between the TEAM and NEI data will not be a problem as long as the ratio of the NEI 
approximation to the true pollution from manufacturing remains constant over time. If 
true manufacturing pollution grows relative to this NEI approximation, I will be 
increasingly understating pollution from manufacturing and exaggerating the role of 
technology in abating pollution. More likely, if true manufacturing pollution shrinks 
relative to the NEI approximation, I will be increasingly overstating manufacturing 
pollution and understating the role of technology. 
For some recent years (1990 and the period from 1996 to 2001), the U.S. EPA 
documented pollution by two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, 
making it possible to see whether the ratio of true manufacturing pollution to the NEI 
approximation changed over time, if only for a short portion of the entire three-decade 
time span. Table 2 presents this ratio, the sum of pollution from all manufacturing SIC 
codes (20 through 39), divided by the total manufacturing pollution from the NEI 
approximated by the five starred activity codes in Table 1. The ratios remain remarkably 
stable. None display marked upward trends. If anything, the overall trend is downward, 
suggesting that the NEI approximation may increasingly overstate pollution from 
manufacturing, If so, my decomposition analysis will understate the role of technology in 
abating that pollution.    
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Outsourcing Electricity Generation 
A second potential concern about this analysis is that much of the pollution being 
studied is emitted as a byproduct of energy generation. If over time manufacturers 
increasingly purchase electricity from utilities, rather than generating power themselves, 
pollution may simply be moving from the manufacturing sector to the utility sector. Any 
cleanup we perceive in manufacturing may be the spurious result of outsourcing 
electricity generation. 
To see whether manufacturers are increasingly purchasing electricity from offsite 
generators, I examined data from the Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey 
(MECS), which has been conducted every third or fourth year since 1985. Net purchases 
of electricity by manufacturers has remained constant at between 22 and 24 percent over 
the past two decades (see Table 3). While I cannot say for sure that increased outsourcing 
of electricity generation does not explain some of the declines in manufacturing pollution 
prior to 1985, outsourcing has not been responsible for the declines since 1985. 
Changing Industry Definitions 
The U.S. manufacturing data (and the international trade data used in Part 2) are 
organized by four-digit SIC codes that were defined in 1987. The TEAM data use the 
NAICS codes as defined in 1997. Each is a hierarchical numerical classification of 
industries, with similar industries grouped into separate classifications. 
To match the SIC and NAICS industry classifications, I rely on a Census Bureau 
publication of the 1997 industry-level aggregates using both the SIC and NAICS 
classifications (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).6 From these 1997 data I constructed a 
concordance, or "crosswalk," between the 1987 SIC codes and the 1997 NAICS codes. 
The concordance reports the fraction of the output of each four-digit SIC code that is 
attributable to each six-digit NAICS code and vice versa.7 
                                                 
6 Electronic versions of this publication can be found at www.census.gov/epcd/ec97brdg. 
7 For some industries, the Census Bureau withholds the value shipped to avoid disclosing confidential 
business information. In those cases the share of establishments serves as a proxy for value shipped. I 
assume that the share of establishments equals the share of value shipped for industries where value 
shipped is undisclosed. Within industry groups (the NAICS four-digit codes), I then subtract the sum of 
value shipped for the reporting industries to obtain the residual undisclosed amount. Next, I apply the 
proportions calculated from establishment numbers to the residual undisclosed amount to estimate the value 
shipped for each undisclosed industry.     
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The final data set includes only those observations that are defined as 
manufacturing in both data sets: SIC codes 2011 through 3999 and NAICS codes 311111 
through 339999. This eliminates cases where the industry redefinition changed whether 
or not an industry was included in the manufacturing sector. It contains crosswalks 
between 453 four-digit SIC codes in 1987 and 469 six-digit NAICS codes in 1997. Of 
these, the SIC and NAICS codes matched perfectly in 229 cases, where the 
reclassification merely relabeled the industry. 
Changing Relative Product Prices 
Comparisons across three decades necessitate adjusting for price inflation, which 
would be a simple task if prices of all goods changed proportionately. But in some 
industries, prices rose faster than the average for the manufacturing sector. Petroleum 
prices, for example, grew faster than the producer price index (PPI) from 1972 to 2001 
(508 percent for petroleum refineries [SIC 2911] compared to 237 percent for the PPI). 
Manufacturing expensive fuel, though, does not pollute more than manufacturing cheap 
fuel. If we divide each industry's output by the overall PPI, and then multiply by its 
emissions coefficient to get predicted pollution, we will overstate the growth of pollution 
from petroleum and exaggerate the role of technology in abating that pollution. This line 
of reasoning would suggest using industry-specific price deflators. 
On the other hand, many industries have seen spectacular falls in their relative 
prices resulting from changes in the natures of their underlying products. The PPI for 
computers (SIC 3571) fell 99 percent from 1972 to 2001. If we take that literally, and 
adjust each industry's value shipped by an industry-specific measure of inflation, we 
would have to multiply the value of computer production by 100. But manufacturing 
computers with faster processors does not necessarily pollute more than manufacturing 
slow computers. If we divide each industry's output by an industry-specific price index, 
then multiply by its emissions coefficient, we will vastly overstate the growth of pollution 
from computer manufacturing. Because high-tech industries that have experienced these 
types of price deflations tend to be less polluting, using their industry-specific price 
indices will overstate the "green" shift in the composition of U.S. manufacturing output    
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toward clean products and understate the role of technology. This line of reasoning would 
suggest using an economy-wide price deflator such as the PPI.8 
In the energy industries, prices rose because of factors unrelated to the nature of 
the product. Deflating output using the PPI, then, would overstate the growth of energy 
industries. Since energy industries are relatively pollution intensive, using the PPI would 
exaggerate the predicted amount of pollution based on the scale and composition of 
manufacturing, in turn exaggerating the technique effect. Notably, this method would 
also exaggerate the growth of energy-intensive industries from 1970 through the mid-
1980s – when energy prices rose fastest – and understate their growth after 1985. This 
would lead to overstating the technique effect before the mid-1980s and understating it 
thereafter. The end result would overstate the slowdown of technology's contribution to 
pollution abatement.  
In the computer and electronic industries, the nature of the products changed, and 
BEA economists have calculated an implicit price decline. If we adjust nominal computer 
sales using the BEA index for computers, we inflate that relatively clean industry's 
output, overstate its share in predicted overall manufacturing pollution, and understate the 
technique effect. 
To be complete, I have calculated results using both the PPI and industry-specific 
price deflators, but I focus on the industry-specific analysis, keeping in mind throughout 
that this will likely overstate the composition effect relative to the technique effect. Given 
that the bottom-line results of this first part of the analysis are that (1) the technique effect 
dominates and (2) technique's dominance has declined, using the industry-specific 
deflators represents the more conservative of the two approaches. 
Scale, Composition, and Technique in Practice 
Figure 1 illustrates the analysis for the sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions. (Figures 
for the other pollutants look similar.) The top line – line number 1 – simply reports the 
total value of manufacturing shipments, scaled so that the 1972 value equals 100. If the 
mix of industries making up the manufacturing sector remained constant (dθ = 0), and the 
                                                 
8 Some analysts have even suggested that computer-related industries should use a constant deflator 
(Meade 2000).    
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techniques of production remained constant (dz = 0), this top line would represent how 
emissions would have changed over time. The manufacturing sector grew by 71 percent 
over this period. This is the scale effect.9 
The bottom line – line 2 – plots SO2 emissions by the manufacturing sector, as 
reported by the NEI and scaled so that 1972 emissions equal 100. Emissions drop 
steadily, and 2001 SO2 emissions are 66 percent below their 1972 levels. This represents 
the combined scale, composition, and technique effects, or (dP) in equation (3). 
The middle line in Figure 1 – line 3 – is the result of multiplying each industry's 
value of shipments in each year (vit) by the TEAM emissions coefficient for SO2 in 1997 
(zi) and aggregating across industries. It represents what SO2 emissions would be in each 
year if each separate manufacturing industry produced its concurrent output, but used the 
production technique that generated the same amount of SO2 per dollar of output that it 
did in 1997. This combines the scale and composition effects, which grew by 19 percent 
from 1972 to 2001.  
These three numbers (scale up 71 percent, SO2 down 66 percent, scale and 
composition up 19 percent) are listed in the first three columns of Table 4. Columns (4) 
through (6) contain the share of the total cleanup that can be attributed, respectively, to 
the scale, composition, and technique effects. Manufacturing grew by 71 percent and 
SO2 emissions fell 66 percent. Therefore the scale effect more than completely offsets 
the decline in pollution (or minus 107) percent of the decline SO2 in emissions can be 
attributed to changes in the scale of manufacturing).  
The composition effect is simply the difference between lines (1) and (3) in 
Figure 1. Scale added 71 percent to SO2 emissions and scale and composition together 
added 19 percent. As a result, the composition effect alone amounts to a 52 percent drop 
in SO2 emissions (relative to the 1972 baseline). This reduction accounts for 79 percent 
of the total emissions decline of 66 percent.  
Finally, the technique effect is simply the difference between lines (2) and (3) in 
Figure 1. Scale, composition, and technique together result in an SO2 emissions 
                                                 
9 This calculation is based on the summation of the value of shipments of six-digit NAICS codes, where 
each industry's value shipped is indexed using an industry-specific price deflator. If instead I aggregate 
across industries before applying an economy-wide PPI, manufacturing output grows by 55 percent.     
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reduction of 66 percent. Scale and composition alone result in an increase of 19 percent. 
Therefore the technique effect alone must amount to a 85 percent drop in emissions, or 
128 percent of the total emissions decline of 66 percent. Changes in technique from 1972 
to 2001 have reduced pollution from the 2001 manufacturing sector by more than the 
total amount of pollution the sector emitted in 1972. 
As a summary statistic for these calculations, Column (7) in Table 4 reports the 
ratio of the technique effect to the composition effect, 1.62. This means that the SO2 
emissions reductions resulting from changing production technologies are more than 1.5 
times as large as the emissions reductions resulting from the changing mix of industries 
that comprise manufacturing. 
Table 4 also presents this same calculation for the other three criteria air 
pollutants individually. Even though we can see differences based on the patterns of 
pollution emissions and growth across industries, the overall result is consistent. In each 
case, the technique effect (Column (6)) accounts for more than 100 percent of the 
cleanup. For VOCs, the composition effect is small, and as a consequence the ratio of 
technique to composition is large (2.71). But in absolute terms the technique effect in 
Column (6) is approximately the same size as for the other pollutants. The bottom row of 
Table 4 contains the same set of calculations for the unweighted sum of all four 
pollutants. Overall, changing technology reduced air pollution from manufacturing by 
1.44 times as much as changing the composition of the manufacturing sector.  
Table 5 presents the ratio of technique to composition for some alternative 
versions of these calculations. Column (1) contains the baseline for comparison, 
repeating Column (7) of Table 4. In Column (2) of Table 5, I conducted the same 
exercise, but used the PPI to deflate industry output instead of using industry-specific 
price deflators. As expected, this greatly increases the estimate of technique relative to 
composition, mostly by exaggerating the growth of pollution from energy-intensive 
industries.  
In column (3) I address the opposite concern, that the industry-specific index for 
computers overstates their importance in the cleanup of manufacturing. I conduct the 
entire analysis without the eight SIC codes where the industry-specific price index falls    
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between 1972 and 2001.10 Deflating output from those eight industries suggests their 
output grew by more than as measured by nominal prices, and if they do not pollute much 
may overstate their role in the composition effect on pollution. As a consequence, 
dropping these eight industries results in a large estimate of the technique effect. The 
ratios of technique to composition effect in column (3) suggest the corresponding 
calculations in column (1) should be interpreted as lower bounds on the role of 
technology. Those baseline numbers inflate the role of composition change by 
exaggerating the shift towards relatively non-polluting high-tech industries. The baseline 
calculation in column (1) thus represents a conservative estimate of the role of 
technology in reducing pollution, because it uses industry-specific price deflators which 
exaggerate the shift towards relatively clean computers and electronics industries. 
Columns (4) and (5) describe the change in this ratio over time. Looking back at 
Figure 1, the technique effect is the difference between the bottom line (scale, 
composition, and technique) and the middle line (scale and composition). The gap 
appears to grow quickly during the first decade or so and then slow down, suggesting that 
the technique effect has diminished in importance over time. To document this, Table 5 
reports the ratios of technique to composition for two separate time periods: 1972–1985 
and 1985–2001. In each case, the ratio of technique to composition is smaller during later 
years. Technique appears to have played a larger role than composition in the cleanup of 
U.S. manufacturing, but the ratio falls over time. 
All four of the air pollutants show a marked decline in the technique effect over 
the three decades since the 1970s. There may be several reasons for this. First, marginal 
abatement costs could be increasing, and all of the least expensive abatement 
technologies might have been employed in the response to the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air 
Acts.11 However, it seems equally likely that there are increasing marginal costs 
                                                 
10 These are electronic computers (3571), computer storage devices (3572), computer terminals (3575), 
computer equipment n.e.c. (3577), calculating and accounting machines (3578), household audio and video 
equipment (3651), semiconductors (3674), and magnetic and optical media (3695). 
11 Cost-minimizing polluters will employ abatement technologies in the order of increasing marginal cost, 
which means that as more is done, abatement becomes more costly. If polluters were mandated to reduce 
pollution, but left on their own to choose the method (output reduction, international outsourcing, or 
technological abatement), we might expect to see the pattern depicted in Table 4.  Of course, polluters were 
not free to choose because technologies were mandated by the 1970, 1977, and 1990 Clean Air Acts. Those 
laws, however, may reflect the underlying realities of increasing marginal cost and mandate successively 
smaller increments in abatement.     
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associated with altering the composition of U.S. manufacturing or relocating industries 
abroad. Some industries have inelastic demand and are immobile, and their share of 
output is unlikely to decline. Others have elastic demand or are mobile, and U.S. 
production should decline in the face of increasing costs. Whether increasing marginal 
costs of technological abatement are larger or smaller than the increasing marginal costs 
of compositional change is an open question. It is not obvious a priori that the ratio of 
technique to composition effects will necessarily fall over time. 
A second explanation for the falling ratio of technique to composition is that 
regulators may have demanded successively smaller increases in abatement technology. 
If there is a trend away from U.S. production of polluting goods that is unrelated to 
regulations, that effect will come to dominate over time as technological advances shrink. 
Third, and perhaps most likely, the diminishing importance of technology in 
abating polluting may be due to the fact that energy prices increased sharply during the 
1970s and early 1980s, and decreased thereafter.  High energy costs gave manufacturers 
incentives to increase energy efficiency, which also reduced pollution.  The high energy 
costs were experienced world-wide, and could not be avoided by relocating overseas.  
Hence in the 1970s and early 1980s we see technique dominating composition.  Once 
energy costs start to fall in the mid-1980s, energy efficiency improvements slowed down, 
and composition changes took on greater importance. 
Before drawing general conclusions about the analysis so far in Part 1, one 
important caveat deserves mention: intra-industry composition.  
One final caveat: Intra-industry composition 
The analyses in tables 4 and 5 rely on a decomposition of the U.S. manufacturing 
sector into 469 six-digit NAICS industry codes. These codes represent a relatively fine 
categorization of industries. Twenty-five different six-digit NAICS codes comprise the 
primary metals industries, ranging from iron foundries to rolled steel shape 
manufacturers. Eighteen codes make up paper manufacturing, ranging from pulp mills to 
envelope manufacturers. Despite the level of disaggregation, a concern remains – that 
heterogeneity within six-digit NAICS codes may be driving what I describe here as a 
technique effect. If six-digit NAICS industries contain subindustries of varying pollution 
intensity, and the composition of individual industries has shifted toward less-polluting 
subindustries over time, some of what I have described as a technique effect may actually 
be another form of composition effect, at a level of disaggregation too fine to see with the    
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six-digit NAICS classifications. However, composition changes within NAICS codes 
would have to be implausibly large relative to those across NAICS codes to overturn the 
basic result of this analysis – that technology accounts for more pollution reduction than 
composition change. 
Part 1 Conclusion: The Role of Technology in Pollution Abatement 
Even being cautious about the role of relative price indices and the possibility of 
intra-industry composition effects, the implications of the simple decomposition here are 
stark. Air pollution from manufacturing has declined significantly in the United States 
despite increases in manufactured output. Most of this improvement seems to arise from 
changes in the way goods are produced (technique), rather than the types of goods 
produced (composition), although the role of technique may be waning. 
A substantial composition effect does remain, however. Changes in the mix of 
industries have reduced air pollution from manufacturing by as much as 36 to 60 percent 
relative to the amount in 1972.12 And that composition effect grows in importance as the 
technique effect fades. This change in manufacturing composition could itself come from 
one of two sources – changes in consumption or changes in net imports. If the change 
comes from imports, important concerns arise for the environment in the origin countries, 
especially the least developed countries. In the future, these countries will not be able to 
repeat U.S. success in abating pollution without even less-developed countries from 
which to import polluting goods. In Part 2, I ask explicitly how much of the pollution 
reductions from composition change can possibly be explained by the increase in net 
imports of pollution-intensive manufactured goods.  
Part 2: International Trade – An Input-Output Approach to Measuring Embodied 
Pollution 
Part 1 shows that although most of the pollution reduction from U.S. 
manufacturing has come from technology, a significant and growing part has also come 
from shifting over time toward production of less-polluting goods. A logical next 
question to ask is how much this green shift in U.S manufacturing can be explained by 
increasing imports of more-polluting goods. For comparison with Part 1, I continue using 
                                                 
12 This is the difference between Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4.    
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the four pollutants studied earlier. But because I do not need emissions data back to 1972 
for this part of the paper (I only need the industry-specific emissions coefficients (z) for 
one year), I expand the analysis to study 9 different air, water, and toxic pollutants.  
A number of papers have examined this issue, but the standard approach has had 
several shortcomings. First, all the papers to date use the World Bank's 1987 Industrial 
Pollution Projection System (IPPS), which is now two decades old.13 If environmental 
regulations and technological progress have succeeded in reducing the pollution emitted 
per unit of output from the dirtiest industries, using the IPPS exaggerates the degree to 
which the change in the composition of the U.S. manufacturing sector has reduced 
pollution.14 Moreover, the IPPS index is based on pollution data from 1987 that have 
since been refined. For example, one input to the IPPS is the Toxics Release Inventory, 
for which 1987 was the first year of data collection, with low participation rates by 
industry. I use the TEAM data described in Part 1, which is based on emissions and 
output data from 1997. These more-recent data are less likely to exaggerate the green 
shift of U.S. manufacturing or imports.  
More importantly, papers to date on this topic have focused only on the pollution 
content generated by each industry directly, ignoring the pollution generated by the 
manufacture of intermediate inputs to those industries. This is appropriate when 
documenting changes in U.S. manufacturing, where intermediate good production is 
counted separately. But for imports, where only the final good is observed, omitting 
pollution from intermediate goods can significantly understate the potential role of trade 
in the green shift of U.S. manufacturing. To address this factor content issue, I use the 
BEA's benchmark input-output tables for 1997, along with a Leontief-style input-output 
model to adjust the TEAM emissions content for the total pollution displaced by imports, 
including their intermediate inputs. 
                                                 
13 The IPPS is described in Hettige et al. (1995). Previous studies using the IPPS include Kahn (2003), 
Schatan (2003), Cole (2004), Ederington et al. (2004), and Gamper-Rabindran (2006). 
14 This is essentially an environmental version of the standard Laspeyres-Paasche price index problem.  
Using an index (prices or pollution intensities) from earlier in the time beriod overstates the change (price 
inflation or the composition effect).  Using an index from later in the time period overstates the change. 
Thus by using the 1997 TEAM data to measure pollution intensities, I overstate the relative cotribution of 
composition change to reducing pollution, and provide a conservative estimate of the importance of 
technolgy.    
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I conduct two straightforward exercises. First, I show that despite the concerns of 
trade agreement opponents and antiglobalization protesters, the pollution content of 
imports to the United States has become cleaner over time, not dirtier, even accounting 
for pollution from intermediate inputs to imports. In fact, imports have been getting 
cleaner faster than domestic production. Second, in a simple thought experiment, I offset 
the effect of trade on U.S. manufacturing by adding all increases in imports over the past 
30 years back into U.S. production, and subtracting all increases in exports. I compare the 
pollution that would have been generated by this hypothetical "no-trade-growth" U.S. 
manufacturing base to that generated by the actual U.S. manufacturing base. Despite 
enormous growth in the scale of imports, trade increases have not been large enough to 
account for the green shift of U.S. manufacturing. For most pollutants, increased trade is 
sufficient to explain no more than about half of the pollution reductions from the 
composition change of U.S. manufacturing.  
The Composition of Trade 
The concerns voiced about the relationship between pollution and trade have a 
common theme – that industries will relocate outside the United States to save on 
environmental compliance costs. If this has been happening, over time we should see 
relatively less manufacturing of highly polluting goods in the United States and relatively 
more net imports of those goods from overseas. Part 1 documented the green shift of U.S. 
manufacturing. Here, I apply a similar approach to imports.  
Let P
M be the amount of domestic pollution displaced by imports, by which I 
mean the amount of pollution that would have been emitted in the United States had 
those imported goods been produced domestically. P
M can be written as the sum of the 
pollution displaced by each industry, pi
M, which in turn can be written as the total value 
of imports, (V










Pp V z θ == ∑ ∑  (4)    
 
 
  17  
This is a direct analog to equation (1), which applies to U.S. domestic production. Data 
on V
M and θ
M come from the Center for International Data (Feenstra 1996, 1997), and 
have been translated from SIC codes to NAICS codes using the concordance described in 
Part 1.15 Note that P
M  does not tell us the amount of pollution occurring overseas as a 
consequence of producing goods for the United States, because other countries 
presumably have different emissions coefficients (z).  Rather, P
M  is the amount of 
pollution that would have been emitted in the United States had those imports been 
produced domestically. 
How much of the green shift of U.S. manufacturing can be explained by the 
pollution displaced by imports, as measured by equation (4)? Figure 2 begins to illustrate 
the analysis for SO2 emissions. The top line in Figure 2 is an index (1972 = 100) of real 
U.S. manufacturing imports, which grew 641 percent from 1972 to 2001. This is 
analogous to the scale effect of manufacturing. If imported goods contain the same mix 
of industries as domestic production, we could say that the amount of U.S. pollution 
displaced by imports grew 641 percent.  
Of course, the composition of imported goods has also been changing over time. 
Multiplying each industry's imports by its 1997 SO2 emissions coefficient and then 
aggregating across industries for each year generates the bottom line depicted in Figure 2. 
SO2 emissions displaced by imports would grow by 146 percent. Or, put differently, SO2 
emissions displaced by imports were 67 percent lower than the pure scale effect of 
imports would predict.16 Column (2) of Table 6 contains these calculations of the 
composition effect of imports for nine individual pollutants. The composition effects 
range from 61 percent for VOCs to 82 percent for biological oxygen demand (BOD), a 
measure of water pollution.17  
Column (1) of Table 6 contains these same calculations for the effects of scale 
and composition on U.S. pollution, using equation (1). These effects are much smaller 
                                                 
15 The Center for International Data at the University of California Davis (UCD) can be found at 
http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu. The data run from 1972 to 2001. 
16 This calculation is (1 + 1.46)/(1 + 6.41) – 1. 
17 I could, in theory, apply this analysis to any of the more than 1,000 chemicals documented in the TEAM 
data. Here I use the criteria pollutants, for comparison with Part 1, along with two common measures of 
water pollution (BOD and total suspended solids [TSS]) and two aggregations of toxic chemicals (released 
to air and released to water).    
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than the calculations for imports in Column (2). The changing composition of U.S. 
manufacturing reduced the benchmark four criteria air pollutants by 30 percent; the 
changing composition of imports (by this calculation) reduced the pollution displaced by 
those imports by 66 percent. This begins to suggest that imports have been shifting 
toward cleaner goods faster than domestically produced goods, and that increased trade 
may not account for (or even contribute to) the green shift of U.S. manufacturing. And 
here is where the previous literature stops. 
There are two problems, however, with stopping at this point and merely pointing 
out that the composition effect as measured using the simple emissions coefficients tilts 
imports toward cleaner industries. First, the simple emissions coefficients neglect the 
intermediate inputs to those imports. Second, focusing solely on the composition effect 
ignores the fact that imports grew so much more in absolute terms than domestic 
production. I address each in order. 
Recent prior work has ignored pollution from intermediate inputs. A simple 
example may help to explain the problem. Suppose that in an initial time period the 
United States produces automobiles. Each car requires one ton of steel as an input, and 
steel is entirely produced domestically. In the second time period, the United States 
imports one more car and produces one fewer. How much of the decline in U.S. pollution 
can be accounted for by the increase in imports? In the example, we can account for 100 
percent by construction. But if we simply multiply the change in imports by the 
respective direct emissions coefficients (the calculation in equation (4) and Figure 2), we 
understate the pollution displaced by imports because there are no steel imports. The 
change in steel production occurs abroad and is embedded in the car. Using the direct 
emissions coefficients ignores the pollution generated by intermediate inputs to imports, 
and makes it appear as though import composition is shifting toward cleaner goods faster 
than it is in reality. The direct emissions coefficients therefore understate the amount of 
U.S. pollution reduction that is merely the consequence of increased imports. 
To correct this, we need to account for not only the pollution embodied in the 
intermediate inputs to imports, but also the pollution embodied in the intermediate inputs 
to those intermediate inputs, and so on ad infinitum. (The steel used to make cars itself    
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requires inputs that may produce pollution, and so on.) For this calculation, I rely on a 
basic Leontief input-output framework.18 
Suppose that xi represents the total output of sector i, including intermediate 
inputs to other industries and final output to either consumption or export. The total 
dollar amount of good i required directly in the production of one dollar's worth of good j 
is cij. Final output is yi. Total output, x, which is a vector of n outputs – one from each 
industry – is the sum of output used as intermediate goods and final output.  
11 1 1 11
1
n
nn n n nn
x cc x y
x cc x y
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 (5) 
Or, in vector notation: 
x=C x+y (6) 
where C is an n × n matrix of direct requirements coefficients with elements cij 
representing the dollar value of input industry i needed to produce one dollar's worth of 
output industry j.  
When we examine U.S. production, we are observing x, the value of all 
shipments, including both intermediate inputs and final products. We can appropriately 
estimate pollution, then, by multiplying x by a vector of direct emissions coefficients z, 
such as those from TEAM. But when we examine imports, we see only final product y, 
without all of the intermediate production. In this case, we need a set of total pollution 
coefficients. These coefficients must embody all the pollution generated by all of the 
inputs to y, all the inputs to those inputs, and so on. To calculate this, we can solve 
equation (6) for x to get 
-1 x=[ I-C ] y (7) 
where I is the identity matrix. The matrix T = [I – C]
–1
 is the Leontief total requirements 
matrix. Each element tij contains the dollar amount of industry i necessary to produce one 
dollar of output industry j, including the amount of i used in all other industries that are 
used in j, as well as the amount of i used in the inputs to those industries, and so forth. 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Miller and Blair (1985).    
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The vector x represents the total amount of manufactured goods necessary to produce 
output y. To generate the total pollution coefficients, I simply premultiply the Leontief 
total requirements matrix by the z vector from TEAM as follows: 
[ ] =
-1
z=z ' T z 'I-C %  (8) 
The only new piece of information we need to construct z %  is C, the matrix of 
direct requirements coefficients. The BEA publishes an input-output table for the United 
States, and I use the 1997 version to create the matrix C for the manufacturing sector. 
The BEA tables are organized by commodity rather than industry, but for the 
manufacturing sector, commodity codes mostly map one to one into NAICS industry 
codes. For those that do not, I aggregate up to the level of five-digit NAICS codes, and, 
in 13 cases, to four-digit NAICS codes. The resulting C matrix is 344 × 344. 
Using the total emissions coefficients, z % , in place of the direct emissions 
coefficients, z, captures all of the pollution generated by intermediate goods, and does not 
understate displaced pollution. There is, however, a further complication. If the steel used 
in the production of automobiles in the United States is entirely imported, importing an 
automobile from abroad displaces no U.S. steel pollution, and the appropriate emissions 
coefficient is the direct one (z). Suppose, however, that 10 percent of the steel used in 
U.S. automobile production is imported in the first period. If the U.S. imports one car in 
the second period, U.S. steel production declines by 0.9 tons and steel imports decline by 
0.1 tons. Pollution in the United States declines by the amount emitted from 
manufacturing one automobile and 0.9 tons of steel.  
The only way to solve this problem is to adjust the pollution coefficients to 
account for the imported fraction. We must multiply the direct requirements coefficients 
by the fractions of goods in each industry that are produced domestically. In other words, 
we need to replace the C matrix in the inverse Leontief calculation with diag(d)C, where 
d is an n × 1 vector whose elements are the share of each industry supplied by domestic 
production.19  
                                                 
19 The domestic share of supply is defined as 1 – imports/(domestic production + imports – exports).    
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These emissions coefficients, z
*, are total domestic requirements emissions coefficients.20 
Figure 2 demonstrates the effect of this adjustment. The bottom line depicts the 
amount of U.S. pollution displaced by imports, using the direct emissions coefficients 
that fail to account for intermediate goods (z). The middle line uses the total domestic 
requirements emissions coefficients (z
* in place of z). Multiplying each industry's imports 
by its zi
*, and then aggregating across industries for each year, shows us that SO2 
emissions displaced by imports would grow by 385 percent. If we use z* instead of z, we 
see that emissions displaced by imports are 44 percent lower than the 641 percent 
increase that would have been predicted by the growth in the scale of imports alone.  
Table 6 contains this calculation – the composition shift of imported goods using 
the total domestic emissions coefficient (Column 3) – along with similar calculations for 
each of nine individual pollutants. The numbers range from 28 percent for CO to 81 
percent for BOD. In every case, the displaced pollution estimated using the total domestic 
requirements coefficients is larger than the estimate obtained using the direct 
requirements coefficients (because the coefficients are by definition larger). 
Consequently, the estimated green shift of imports is smaller.  
U.S. imports are dominated by trade with other industrialized countries, but 
pollution haven worries focus on developing countries. To address this, column (4) of 
Table 6 presents the same calculation for imports from outside of the OECD. It turns out, 
however, that the green shift in imports from non-OECD countries toward cleaner goods 
is approximately as large as the green shift in imports in general, and typically much 
larger than the green shift in U.S. manufacturing.  
Adjusting for factor content diminishes the previous result (that imports shifted 
toward cleaner goods faster than goods manufactured domestically), but does not 
                                                 
20 Note that this assumes that the fraction of any input that is imported is the same, regardless of which 
industry uses it.     
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eliminate it. Most of the import growth seems to have come from industries that were not 
pollution intensive in the United States, even after accounting for pollution from 
intermediate inputs. Even though previous studies – in which analysts used direct 
requirements coefficients – got the magnitude wrong, the basic finding remains valid. 
The U.S. manufacturing sector has shifted away from polluting goods, and imports have 
shifted even further away from polluting goods. The green shift of U.S. manufacturing 
has not been accompanied by a corresponding "brown" shift in imports to the United 
States. Instead, imports have been shifting toward cleaner goods faster than those 
produced domestically. 
Results like these have been interpreted as evidence that U.S. environmental 
policies are not pushing U.S. polluting manufacturers overseas, but that conclusion does 
not necessarily follow. We do not know what the composition of imports would have 
been without changes in U.S. environmental regulations. Perhaps imports would have 
shifted toward less-polluting goods even faster. The best we can do with these data is ask 
whether the overall size of import growth is sufficient to account for the pollution 
reductions resulting from the green shift of U.S. manufacturing. If import growth is small 
or composed of clean industries (with clean intermediate inputs), the composition-related 
pollution reductions in the United States cannot possibly be explained by international 
trade.  
Whether international trade increases have been sufficient to account for the green 
shift of U.S. manufacturing depends on both the composition and scale of imports, and 
these effects work in opposite directions. Although imports became 28 to 81 percent 
cleaner from 1972 to 2001, those imports increased by more than five times. This might 
leave ample room for imports to replace pollution generated during domestic production 
because the overall pollution content of imports (counting both the composition and 
scale) has increased.  
The Pollution Content (Scale and Composition) of Trade 
Figure 1 illustrates the last step in this analysis, explaining the fraction of U.S. 
emissions reduction that can be explained by changes in the combined scale and 
composition of imports. Recall that the gap between lines (1) and (3) depicts the green 
shift in U.S. manufacturing away from pollution-intensive goods.    How much of this shift 
can be explained by increased imports? If we multiply each industry's net imports 
(imports minus exports) by the relevant total domestic requirements pollution    
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coefficients, (zi*), we obtain an estimate of the amount of U.S. pollution displaced by net 
imports. To show the change over time, use the difference between each year's net 
imports and net imports in 1972. This series is plotted as line (4) in Figure 1. Holding 
technology fixed as of 1997, this line represents what air pollution from manufacturing 
would have been if every bit of increased net imports since 1972 had instead been 
manufactured in the United States. As shown in the figure, adding back into U.S. 
emissions the amount displaced by imports (using the total emissions factors that account 
for pollution from intermediate goods) accounts for roughly half of the green shift of U.S. 
manufacturing.21  
I recognize, of course, that this "no-net-trade-growth" scenario represents an 
extremely unlikely partial-equilibrium thought experiment. Had there been no net trade 
growth, surely the mix of goods consumed by the U.S. economy would have been much 
different. In no sense does the "without net imports" line in Figure 1 represent what the 
pollution content of U.S. manufacturing actually would have been absent trade growth. 
Instead, I think of the no-net-trade growth scenario as an accounting exercise – asking 
what fraction of the composition-related cleanup of U.S. manufacturing can be matched 
to increased imports of pollution-intensive products, not what pollution in the U.S. would 
have been absent the ability to import those products. In fact, if the U.S. imports 
pollution-intensive goods because they are less expensive when produced overseas, in the 
absence of trade growth the United States would likely consume and produce fewer 
pollution intensive goods, changing the baseline (pollution) and the overall scale 
(manufacturing output). 
Table 7 summarizes this calculation. Adding back pollution displaced by net 
imports and accounting for intermediate goods accounts for 53 percent of this green shift 
for SO2 pollution (column (2)). Column (2) of Table 7 contains this same no-trade-
growth thought experiment for each of nine individual pollutants. For each of the 
pollutants except CO, the net pollution embodied in the increased trade accounts for no 
more than about half of the green shift of U.S. manufacturing. For CO, trade accounts for 
99 percent of the change. For BOD, exports of pollution-intensive goods grew enough 
                                                 
21 Note that this no-trade-growth scenario exaggerates the role of trade, because it holds imports constant at 
their 1972 levels in real terms, which means that imports' share of manufacturing would decline over time. 
An intermediate case would hold the import growth rate equal to the growth of U.S. manufacturing.     
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that the net effect of trade makes the U.S. industrial composition more pollution 
intensive, rather than less.22  
Table 7 contains two other sets of calculations for comparison. Column (1) 
conducts the analysis using the direct requirement coefficients, failing to account for the 
pollution content of intermediate inputs to imports. The amount of the green shift of U.S. 
manufacturing explained by trade growth is much smaller (5 percent rather than 53 
percent for SO2), but of course this understates the pollution content of imports by 
ignoring intermediate inputs. More significantly, Column (3) conducts the analysis for 
trade with non-OECD countries, which are of most concern to those worried about 
pollution havens. For most pollutants, trade growth with these non-OECD countries 
appears to account for only about one-quarter of the green shift of U.S. manufacturing. 
Displaced Pollution and the Pollution Havens Hypothesis 
These analyses demonstrate that the increase in the pollution content of imported 
goods is typically insufficient to explain the decline in U.S. manufacturing pollution 
resulting from the changing composition of U.S. industries. When we import a product, 
the pollution from its manufacture occurs abroad, not in the United States. I have focused 
here on the resulting decline in U.S. pollution, not the increase in overseas pollution. The 
results do not tell us what has happened to the environment in countries from which the 
United States imports goods, only what pollution in the United States would have been 
had those goods been produced at home – what I have called "displaced" pollution.  
Furthermore, the analysis here implies no causality. I have not asked why the U.S. 
composition changed nor why imports increased. I have only attempted to show that the 
scale of imports is insufficient to account for the green shift of U.S. manufacturing, even 
including the pollution caused by intermediate inputs to imports. 
                                                 
22 These outliers are explained by a relatively small number of industries. Each industry's effect on the total 
depends on three items – the size of its imports and exports, the change in its imports and exports, and its 
emissions coefficient (zi*). For CO, automobile imports alone grew by enough to displace 14 percent of 
U.S. CO emissions in 1972. Adding those imports back into U.S. production explains a large fraction of the 
decline in U.S. CO emissions. For BOD, pulp and paper exports alone grew enough to increase U.S. 
emissions by 27 percent. Subtracting those exports would have made the U.S. manufacturing sector 
significantly cleaner. No other industry-pollutant combination comes close to these two in terms of 
explaining the results in Table 6.     
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A large body of literature does address these causal relationships. In particular, 
analysts have tried to assess the degree to which increasing environmental regulations in 
the United States have caused either the green shift or the increase in imports. The results 
of the analysis in this paper have no bearing on that literature. My finding that the 
composition of imports has been shifting toward clean goods faster than the composition 
of goods produced domestically does not mean that there is no pollution haven effect. 
Perhaps the green shift of imports would have been larger and the green shift of U.S. 
manufacturing smaller in the absence of U.S. environmental laws. The finding that the 
pollution content of imports is sufficient to offset only about half of the pollution changes 
resulting from the scale and composition of U.S. manufacturing does not mean that these 
changes were themselves caused by U.S. environmental laws. The changes in industry 
composition and imports are the result of many concurrent trends in addition to 
environmental costs, such as changes in labor, energy, shipping, and tariff costs, among 
others. Sorting out which costs drive changes in U.S. industrial composition and imports 
is a job for another paper. This paper merely documents that fact that the growth and 
composition of imports to the United States is sufficient to explain at most about half of 
the pollution reductions achieved from producing a cleaner mix of goods at home.  
Conclusion  
Separating the decline in manufacturing emissions into its three components 
(scale, composition, and technique) is important for several reasons. Most U.S. 
environmental regulations have been designed explicitly to affect production 
technologies, not to depress manufacturing or alter the mix of goods manufactured. And 
most measures of the costs of environmental regulations focus on easily measured costs 
of abatement technologies, not the diminished consumer or producer surplus from 
reduced or relocated production. If pollution reductions result from changes in the overall 
scale or composition of U.S. manufacturing, there could potentially be adverse 
consequences. Environmental improvements could then be said to have imposed large, 
unmeasured economic costs; to have imposed large changes in goods we consume; or to 
have shifted pollution from the United States to other countries. Furthermore, none of 
these changes would be replicable by all countries indefinitely. If the pollution reductions 
come from technological progress, however, there is nothing suggesting that the trend 
cannot continue indefinitely and be repeated around the world.    
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The good news, then, is that most of the pollution reduction over the past 30 years 
has come from changes in technology, rather than from changes in imports or changes in 
the types of goods produced domestically. Criteria air pollutants collectively declined 58 
percent from 1972 to 2001, despite a 71 percent increase in manufacturing output. The 
cleanup was accomplished by changing the mix of goods produced and by altering the 
technologies used to produce those goods. For a typical pollutant, technology accounts 
for a large majority of the cleanup. Moreover, although some of the improvement is due 
to the changing composition of industries, that change cannot be explained by increases 
in imports. For the typical pollutant, increased international trade explains at  most half of 
the pollution reductions from composition changes in U.S. manufacturing. Those 
composition changes in turn explain less than half of the overall reduction in U.S. 
manufacturing pollution. 
Together these findings suggest that the environmental concerns of 
antiglobalization protesters have been overblown, and that the pollution reduction 
achieved by U.S. manufacturing will replicable by other countries in the future.  Most of 
the environmental improvements in the United States have come from technology, not 
from relocating polluting industries overseas. That good news must be tempered 
somewhat by the fact that the role of technology appears to be shrinking, making 
composition changes increasingly important to pollution reduction.    
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Fuel combustion – electric utilities 
Fuel combustion – industrial 
Fuel combustion – other 
Chemical and allied products manufacturing 
Metals processing 
Petroleum and related industries 
Other industrial processes 
Solvent utilization 
Storage and transport 
Waste disposal and recycling 
On-road vehicles 
Non-road vehicles and engines 
Natural sources 
Miscellaneous 






Table 2. Ratio of True Manufacturing Pollution Using SIC Codes 20–39  
To Approximation Using NEI Activity Codes 
 
Pollutant 1990 ... 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 
All  four  0.77 ... 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.73 
SO2  0.66 ... 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.69 
NOX  0.50 ... 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.51 
CO  0.95 ... 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 
VOCs  1.08 ... 1.08 1.09 1.07 0.94 0.91 0.91 
NOTES: Each number in this table is total manufacturing pollution from the NEI calculated as the sum of 
pollution from all manufacturing SIC codes (20 through 39), divided by the total manufacturing pollution 
from the NEI approximated by the five starred activity codes in Table 1. 
SIC = Standard Industrial Classification; NEI = National Emissions Inventory; CO = carbon monoxide; 
SO2 = sulfur dioxide; NOx = nitrogen oxides; VOCs = volatile organic compounds 
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Table 3. Net Electricity Purchases from Offsite 
As a Share of Total Energy Consumed by Manufacturing 
 
  1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 
        
Share purchased from offsite     0.230 0.225 0.219 0.220 0.227  0.237 
        
 
SOURCE: Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS), US Bureau of the Census. 
 
 
Table 4. Scale, Composition, and Technique Effects for Criteria Pollutants:  
1972–2001* 






























   
SO2 0.71 –0.66  0.19  –1.07  0.79  1.28  1.62 
NOx 0.71 –0.30  0.21  –2.37  1.67  1.70  1.02 
 CO  0.71  –0.62  0.11  –1.14  0.97  1.18  1.22 
VOCs 0.71  –0.61  0.35  –1.17  0.59  1.58  2.71 
 
All four  0.71  –0.58  0.18  –1.22  0.91  1.31  1.44 
*Using industry-specific price deflators 
NOTES: SO2 = sulfur dioxide; NOx = nitrogen oxides; CO = carbon monoxide; VOCs = volatile organic 
compounds    
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SO2 1.62  7.43  5.89  5.41 1.29 
NOx 1.02  4.92  2.66  2.47 0.77 
CO 1.22  2.58 2.02  1.94  1.55 
VOCs 2.71  13.18  8.41  7.42  2.51 
 
All four  1.44 4.41  3.34  3.14  1.38 
 
NOTES: SO2 = sulfur dioxide; NOx = nitrogen oxides; CO = carbon monoxide; VOCs = volatile organic 
compounds    
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Table 6. Percentage Difference between Pollution Predicted by Total Imports and 




















SO2 -0.299 -0.669  -0.439  -0.504 
NOx -0.282 -0.675  -0.437  -0.510 
CO -0.342  -0.646  -0.282  -0.191 
VOCs -0.192  -0.607  -0.443  -0.505 
Sum of 4 air 
pollutants from 
section 1 
-0.300 -0.656  -0.355  -0.351 
PM10 -0.292  -0.723  -0.452  -0.576 
BOD -0.226  -0.819  -0.812  -0.837 
TSS -0.233 -0.740  -0.711  -0.760 
Toxic air  -0.220  -0.686  -0.552  -0.491 
Toxic water  -0.109  -0.679  -0.622  -0.729 
 
NOTES: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; SO2 = sulfur dioxide; NOx = 
nitrogen oxides; CO = carbon monoxide; VOCs = volatile organic compounds; PM10 = particulates with a  
diameter of 10 μm or less; BOD = biological oxygen demand; TSS = total suspended solids    
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Using Total Domestic Requirements 
Emissions Coefficients 
Pollutant 
All Net Imports 
(1) 
All Net Imports  
(2) 
Non-OECD Net Imports 
(3) 
 
SO2 0.047  0.530  0.315 
NO2 0.051  0.426  0.204 
CO 0.022  0.989  0.561 
VOCs 0.167  0.565  0.250 
Sum of 4 air 
pollutants from 
section 1  
0.045 0.721  0.401 
PM10 0.011  0.532  0.248 
BOD –0.401  –0.371  –0.257 
TSS –0.042  0.034  –0.040 
Toxic air  0.064  0.575  0.339 
Toxic water  –0.079  0.161  –0.020 
Negative numbers indicate that the change in pollution content of exports is greater than that of imports, 
and that adding back net imports (subtracting exports) makes the resulting series even cleaner. 
NOTES: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; SO2 = sulfur dioxide; NO2 = 
nitrogen dioxide; CO = carbon monoxide; VOCs = volatile organic compounds; PM10 = particulates with a  
mean aerodynamic diameter of 10 μm or less; BOD = biological oxygen demand; TSS = total suspended 
solids 
    
 
 


















      Figure 1. Sulfur Dioxide Emissions from U.S. Manufacturing  
NOTES: NEI = National Emissions Inventory; TEAM = Trade and Environmental Assessment Model  
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All Imports Using Direct Coeffs Using Total Coeffs
 
 
Figure 2. U.S. Imports from All Countries and Displaced Air Pollution* 
* Sum of sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), and volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs)  
    
 